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The role played by “speculators” during the 2007/08 food price spike is lively disputed. Our 
analysis  focuses  on  the  increasing  participation  of  index  funds  in  agricultural  commodity 
futures markets before the food price spike. Our central theme is to determine if their pre-
spike massive entry does prepare the subsequent crisis by maintaining low stock levels. We 
develop a theoretical model explaining the behaviour of speculators and traders on futures and 
cash markets. We allow index funds to inflict an informational externality on commercial 
traders that is supposed to induce a lower desire to hold stock. We find out that, once the 
production  decisions  of  commercial  traders  are  taken  into  account  into  the  model,  the 
increased net long position of index funds is inconsistent with lower stocks. We therefore 
conclude that commodity index funds are not a systematic cause of high market swings and 
that other relevant causes should be further studied. 
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Introduction 
 
The world prices of some agricultural products dramatically increased from 2006 to 2008 and 
decreased  from  2008  to  2010  (figure  1).  Many  economic  analyses  have  been  initiated  to 
understand  these  unexpected  price  spikes.
2  These  analyses  agree  that  a  complex  set  of 
interrelated  factors  explain  these  price  changes.  On  the  other  hand,  the  individual 
contributions of these factors are highly disputed. Probably most controversial is the role 
played during the food crisis by the swap dealers hedging the net position of commodity index 
funds  on  futures  markets
3.  Proponents  of  the  speculative  bubble  theory  mostly  rely  on 
statistical correlations to justify their claim. To the contrary opponents to this theory mainly 
argue that i) the power of these statistical results is rather poor and indeed may suffer from an 
omitted variable bias, ii) the levels of non commercial open interest were relatively stable 
during this period, iii) the procedures by which they roll over their long positions are well 
predictable and thus they are unable to push prices away from fundamental values due to the 
arbitrage by commercial traders iv) many commodities for which futures markets are either 
negligible or non-existent also saw significant price increases, v) stock levels were falling 
rather than increasing.  
 
Our  objective  in  this  paper  is  to  contribute  to  this  vast  literature  on  the  causes  of  the 
commodity prices spike by focusing on the possible role played by index funds before market 
prices start culminating. Available data from CFTC Commitment of Traders reports show that 
index funds almost quadrupled their net long speculative position on the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME) wheat and corn futures contracts over the period 2004-2006 while their 
positions slightly fell over the period 2006-2008 (figure 2). Thus the peak level of index 
holding pre-dates the food price spike. This former rapid and massive involvement of index 
funds in agricultural futures markets and the later consequence on food prices are presently 
rather unexplained. In order to explore these issues, we develop a theoretical model where the 
futures markets are linked to the cash markets through their impact on private stock decisions. 
We start with the analytical framework developed by Stein (1987) who shows that introducing 
more speculators may destabilise commodity prices, reduce stocks and lead to welfare loss. 
The essence of his argument is that the participation of risk neutral speculators in futures 
markets can for a period of time change the informational content of prices. This inflicts an 
externality on risk averse commercial traders, leading them to reduce their willingness to store 
the commodity. Using this framework, one can explain the massive entry of index funds in 
agriculture futures markets during 2004-2006 by a portfolio diversification motive. This has 
contributed to maintain low stock levels by commercial hedgers during that period and hence 
sets the conditions for the subsequent price spike. This theory is consistent with available data 
on stocks which have been low from 2003 to 2007 (figure 3).  
 
In  the  Stein’s  model,  information  of  the  different  (spot  and  futures)  market  participants 
regarding uncertain market developments is of crucial importance. In fact Stein’s main results 
depend on three critical assumptions. The first is that that the commodity market is subject to 
many  economic  risks,  with  some  lasting  over  several  periods.  The  second  is  that  market 
participants receive different signals on these risks and process this information in different 
                                                 
2 A useful review is available in the report by the Global Food Markets Group (2010).  
3 The issue of characterizing such operations into commercial or non commercial positions is still debated in the 
US.  They have been classified by the CFTC as commercial practices for the past years through their portfolio 
diversification goals. They should not be classified as speculative positions in the future for their diversification 
capabilities but could be formally differentiated from traditional hedging practices of commodity trading 
companies.   3 
ways.  The  third  is  that  commodity  producers  are  unable  to  adjust  their  production  levels 
between periods. Regarding the first assumption, it is little questionable that there are many 
sources of risks in the world cereal markets inducing a natural price volatility, such as the 
climatic  risks  at  the  supply  side,  the  sanitary  risk  on  animal  production  translating  into 
uncertain feed demands or even the risks created by public policy (on biofuels for instance). 
Regarding  the  second  assumption,  it  is  also  little  questionable  that  many  variables  are 
“poorly” measured, especially in the short run. Hence agents rely on proxies. Much obvious is 
the level of stocks like, but not exclusively, Chinese stocks. Feed demand is also difficult to 
assess. China became a net importer of cereals in 2004: does this mean that Chinese stocks 
were “empty” and/or that Chinese feed demand was underestimated and/or does it result from 
a change in Chinese storage policy? The “new” demand of cereals for biofuel production was 
also subject to measurement errors in the short run. Analysts may rely on the statistics on the 
intention of, or the building of biofuel refineries but this is only a proxy of their futures 
effective cereal demands. 
On the other hand, the third crucial assumption in the Stein framework, i.e. fixed production 
levels over all periods, is clearly untenable. For instance, the 2008 world grain crop was the 
largest on record and 5% higher than in 2007. Even if improved growing conditions favours 
yields gains, all analysts agree that the previous price spike did generate a significant supply 
response.  
 
Accordingly our methodological contribution in this paper is to expand the Stein’s model by 
allowing production response to spot and futures prices. We maintain a two period model and 
assume a lagged production response of one period. We also generalise the specifications of 
final demand functions in order to analyse the sensitivity of results to the elasticity of demand. 
Stein implicitly assumes a unitary price elasticity of demand which is too restrictive for soft 
commodities. Our model, as well the nested Stein model, is fully presented in the first section 
of this paper. The second section is devoted to the empirical calibration of our model and the 
analysis of results. It is indeed impossible to get a closed form solution that allows us to 
perform standard calculus of static comparative. So we calibrate the model with standard 
behavioral parameters and next perform sensitivity analysis on critical parameters. We focus 




1. Theoretical framework 
 
Following Stein, we make several assumptions in order to make computations tractable. We 
consider a one commodity, two periods model which is sufficient to analyse the impact of 
futures trading on the first period ending stock. We also assume that storage costs and the 
risk-free interest rate are both null. Three agents intervene in the commodity cash and futures 
markets.  First,  final  consumers  are  assumed  to  be  risk  neutral.  They  buy  their  desired 
quantities on the cash market and do not participate in the futures market. Second, producers 
are assumed to be risk averse (with constant absolute risk aversion) and have three functions: 
they  physically  produce  the  commodity,  they  can  store  it  and  they  can  participate  in  the 
futures market for hedging purpose. Finally, commodity index funds only participate in the 
futures market  and  are  assume to be risk neutral in order to simplify  computations. This 
assumption is not so severe if the considered soft commodity has a small weight in the index 
fund portfolio, which is currently the situation
4.  
                                                 
4 DJ UBS and S&P GSCI had respectively 28 and 14 % agricultural soft commodity shares in 2008   4 
 
As stated in the Stein model, there are two sources of risks at each period that are out of 
control of producers.
5 One is a permanent shock occurring over the two periods that all agents 
have difficulty to quantify. The second is a periodic temporary shock that producers only are 
able to observe. In practice, one may consider the climate change effects or the feed demand 
effects as the permanent shock and the yearly pest impact as the temporary shock.  
 
Like Stein we first compute market equilibriums over the two periods first without and then 
with futures markets in order to assess the effects of the commodity index funds.  
 
 
a-  No futures markets 
 
The behaviour of final consumers is summarised by the following linear demand function 
(using usual notation):  
 
1 1 1 1 .P b a D - =                     (1) 
2 2 2 2 .P b a D - =                     (2) 
 
The per period commodity supply is the sum of expected/planned production by producers 
(noted  i Y ) and the two sources of risk, denoted  X  for the permanent shock and  i Z  for the 
temporary shock:  
 
1 1 1 Z X Y S + + =                     (3) 
() 2 2 2 . Z X Y S + + =                     (4) 
 
In the Stein model, the expected productions are null. To the contrary we assume that the first 
period production is exogenous and depends on previous decisions. The production level of 
the second period is optimally determined by risk averse producers. Allowing producers to 
store part of supply from the first period to the second period leads to the following market 
equilibrium conditions:  
 
1 1 1 1 1 . Z X Y I P b a + + = + -                   (5) 
() 2 2 2 2 2 . . Z X Y I P b a + + = - -                 (6) 
 
Like Stein, we abstract from the initial first period level of stocks as well as from the final 
second period stocks. We also assume that stocks are netted out over the two periods. Both 
assumptions are clearly questionable but useful to get tractable analytical solutions. Above all 
these assumptions are maintained throughout the paper so that we are able in that context to 
analyse the impact of adding production response to the Stein model.  
 



























P - - + + - - + =           (7) 
                                                 
5 This can be motivated by additive production risks or alternatively by the existence of many producers in 
different countries, with some producers being risk neutral.    5 
 
When futures trading is not possible, then risk averse producers optimally determine their 
optimal storage level and second period production level in order to maximise their expected 
utility. Their strategy is given by:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2
2
2 2 2 2 1 2 . . . 5 . 0 ,. . max P V Y I Y C P E Y P P E I F F F + - - + - r       (8) 
  
r  is the risk aversion parameter and  () . C  the total cost function. Assuming a quadratic cost 




















2                       (10) 
 
To determine these quantities, we need to compute the second period price expectations of 
producers.  We  assume  that  producers  have  rational  expectations.  Hence  they  know  all 
behavioural parameters, observe the first period level of production, price and the exact level 
of the temporary shock. From this set of information and the first period market equilibrium 
condition  (equation  5),  they  are  able  to  infer  the  exact  level  of  the  permanent  shock. 
Accordingly, we have: 
 

























- + - - + =          (11) 






P VF =                     (12) 
 
Hence the optimal level of stocks is given by:  
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-
- =         (13) 
 
Plugging this inventory demand function into the equilibrium condition for the first period 
leads to the first period equilibrium price:
6  
 
                                                 
6 This expression corresponds to equation 17 of Stein if we assume that  »µ = = = d c b a i i , 0 , 1 , 0  and that 
the number of producers equal one.    6 
( ) ( ) ( )



























































































      (14) 
 
As expected, the equilibrium price in the first period negatively depends on the supply shocks. 
The impact of the permanent shock is greater than the impact of the first period transitory 
shock. We can also check that the impacts of these shocks on first period price decrease when 
final  demand  become  more  price  elastic.  These  impacts  increase  with  the  producer  risk 
aversion and the variance of the second period temporary shock. In other words, if producers 
become  more  risk  averse,  they  reduce  their  storage  level  and  hence  the  first  period 
equilibrium price. Equivalently, if the second period shock becomes more variable, producers 
prefer to reduce their stock that must be released in the second period.  
 
Finally it is interesting to compare this price equilibrium function with the one when the 
second period production response equals zero. The counterpart to equation (14) is given by:  
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There are only two differences between equations 14 and 14’. First the constant term now 
involves the exogenous second period production rather than the origin of the cost curve. 
Second the slope of the cost curve disappears in the left hand term. Hence the more price 
elastic the supply response is (d becomes smaller), the less the final price is sensitive to 
supply shocks.   
 
 
b-  With futures markets 
 
We now introduce future markets assuming that participation in these markets is cost free. On 
the other hand, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) or Andersen (1990) for instance assume the 
presence of transaction costs that explain the absence of some future markets. In our analysis, 
we  abstract  from  these  issues  and  assume  the  existence  of  these  futures  markets  because 
agents have different information sets and/or beliefs. Again this assumption is shared with 
Stein’ analysis.  
 
Futures trading allow commodity index funds, as well as producers, to speculate on futures 
prices
7. It also allows producers to partially/completely hedge their production and stocks. All 
these  decisions  depend  on  the  information  that  is  gathered  by  these  economic  agents. 
Following Stein, we assume that index funds are not able to precisely observe the first period 
temporary  shock  as  much  as  the  producers  do.  We  also  assume  that  they  have  noisy 
                                                 
7 In the real life, the net commodity index funds position is hedged on the futures market through swap dealers   7 
information on the permanent shock. That is they do not observe the permanent shock  X ; 
they rather observe the signal that first period supply is modified by  1 W X SI + = . The main 
issue is that producers are no longer able to infer the permanent shock from the introduction 
of index funds in futures trading. This is so because futures prices and spot prices are now 
linked.  
 
The program of producers is now given by:  
  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 2
2
2
2 2 2 2 1 2
. . . 5 . 0
. . max
P V F Y I
Y C P E Y P P E F P P E I
F F
F f F F F
+ + -
- + - + -
r
         (15) 
 



















2                       (17) 
1 P Pf =                       (18) 
 
Because storage is costless and producers can hedge their production and stock, future price 
and spot price are equal.  
 
With the introduction of index funds and thus expectations of two economic agents, it is no 
longer possible to obtain a closed form solution to the first period equilibrium price like 
presented in equation (14). However it is possible to numerically compute the parameters of 
this equation. We thus search the conditions that these parameters must satisfy. As in the no 
futures market case, we look for a linear price equilibrium solution:  
 
1 1 1 W Z X P W Z X O a a a a + + + =                 (19) 
 
Using equations (19), (7) and (17), we obtain the second period price as a function of shocks 

















































































+ - + - + =
a a a a a a
a
    (20) 
 
 
Commodity  index  funds  are  assumed  to  be  risk  neutral  in  their  positions  on  agricultural 
commodity futures  contracts. Their net long/short position is also assumed to be a linear 
function of the observation made by index funds, i.e. spot prices and their signal on the first 
period supply shocks:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 0 1 1 . . . . . . W Z X W X P F W Z X s m a h a h m a h a h d m h d + + + + + + = + + + =     (21) 
   8 
Index funds are assumed rational in their use of available information. In particular they know 
that storage is costless. Given their information, their expected price change is zero:  
 
( ) ( ) 0 1 2 1 1 2 = - = - SI P P E P P P E S S                 (22) 
 
These two conditions imply the three following restrictions on the unknown parameters of the 












= a                   (23) 
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In order to determine the optimal level of stocks held by producers, we need to compute their 
expectations concerning the mean and variance of the second period price. They are able to 
observe the spot price and the temporary shock. On the other hand, they are no longer able to 
determine the permanent shock. The conditional expected mean and variance are given by 
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          (26) 
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+ + + =
        (27) 
 
At this stage, it is interesting to compare these expressions to those we obtain in the no futures 
case (equations 11 and 12). The expressions (26) and (11) are very similar, except the fact that 
the permanent shock is no longer known for sure by producers. Hence the variability of this 
permanent shock now appears in the expected mean price. We also find that the noisy signal 
perceived by index funds has an impact of expected mean price by producers because they 
both participate in futures trading. As expected, the variance computed by producers for the 
second period price is now higher because producers have less sure information.   
   9 
We are ready to express the inventory demand by producers by plugging (17), (21), (26), (27) 
into (16). So doing we logically assume that the futures market is in equilibrium, i.e. that the 
net  long/short  position  of  index  funds  is  exactly  matched  by  net  short/long  position  by 
producers. The resulting demand of stocks is:  
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m a h a h m a h a h d
a a a a
        (28) 
 
This expression is obviously quite complex and difficult to interpret. One must still note that 
it is linear in the supply  shock variables. The  first line corresponds to the second period 
optimal production, the second line to the level of futures trading and the last two lines to the 
expected price changes divided by the expected variance of the second period price.  
 
Finally plugging this optimal stock demand in the first period market equilibrium condition 
(5) gives us four additional constraints on structural parameters:  
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0 1 1 1 .
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a Y                 (32) 
We thus get a square system of seven conditions (23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33) and seven 
unknown parameters ( m h d a a a a , , , , , , 0 W Z X ) which characterize equilibrium functions when 
futures trading is allowed. This system generalises Stein ones by working in levels (rather on 
deviation  from  trends,  hence  the  introduction  of  constants  in  our  setting)  and  by  the 
introduction of production response.
8   
 
If  the  second  period  production  is  assumed  fixed,  then  this  system  of  equations  must  be 
slightly modified. First all terms where the d  parameter is involved are removed. Second the 
constant of the price equilibrium function is given by:  
 
1 2
2 1 2 1
b b
Y Y a a
O +
- - +
= a                   (23’) 
 
 
2. Empirical results 
 
When futures trading is allowed, we are unable to get an analytical solution to the first period 
price  equilibrium  function.  We  thus  need  to  turn  to  empirical  calibration.  This  is  always 
subject to criticism because behavioural parameters are never perfectly known. Hence we will 
perform a sensitivity analysis of our results to these parameters. To make results as clear as 
possible,  we  always  calibrate  structural  parameters  such  as,  without  supply  shocks,  final 
demands, production levels and prices equal 100 in both periods. We also assume that all 
random variables ( W Z X , , ) are normal with means equal to zero and variance equal to 4. On 
the other hand, we will consider different values of price elasticity of demand and supply as 
well as different values for the risk aversion parameter.  
 
 
  a. Standard calibration 
 
In the base case, we assume that the price elasticity of final demand equals minus one half in 
both periods (hence values of the constant a and the slope b are respectively 150 and 0.5). 
When  supply  response  is  allowed,  we  assume  that  the  supply  price  elasticity  equals  one 
(hence values of constant c and slope d are respectively zero and one). Finally we assume that 
the risk aversion coefficient equals one. Results on price equilibrium functions, inventory 
decisions and futures trading are provided in table 1.  
 
 
                                                 
8 Again we end up with Stein system of conditions if we impose  »µ = = = d c b a i i , 0 , 1 , 0  and that the 
number of producers equals one.  Stein provides proofs of existence and uniqueness of solution in this particular 
context. We also check empirically the stability of solutions.    11 
  i/ Without production response 
 
Without supply response and futures trading (first row of Table 1), we find as expected that 
the optimal stock only depends on the first period temporary shock. For instance, if this first 
period temporary supply shock is positive, then producers increase their stock by 10 per cent 
of this shock. This reduces the drop of the first period price: it only decreases by 180 per cent 
rather than by 200 per cent (due to the 0.5 price elasticity of demand). By definition, the 
demand of storage does not depend on the permanent shock and on the noisy signal perceived 
by index funds.  
 
When futures trading is allowed (second row of Table 1), producers and index funds can now 
speculate on second period prices. As Stein, we find that this modifies the optimal stock level 
even if the current noisy signal (W) equals zero. This is so because the variance of this noisy 
signal is different from zero and thus producers consider that index funds may define their 
futures position with imperfect information. It appears that this optimal stock level negatively 
depends on the noisy signal perceived by index funds. The same negative relationship also 
exists with the net long position of index funds. For example, if index funds receive the signal 
that there is a much higher supply shock than in reality, they prefer to be short rather than 
long  on  futures  markets.  This  information  is  transmitted  to  producers  who  then  prefer  to 
decrease their stock level. This is an example of the information externality revealed by Stein.  
 
More interesting to us is the impact of futures trading on the optimal stock level.  This impact 
positively depends on the permanent and transitory shocks (the multipliers are respectively 
equal to 0.15 and 0.24) and negatively on the noisy signal perceived by index funds (the 
multiplier equals -0.15). It is quite easy to find cases where optimal stocks are reduced due to 
the introduction of futures trading. For example, if there is no permanent shock (X=0) but 
simply a temporary shock equal to one unit (Z=1), then the optimal stock equals 0.1 unit when 
futures  trading  is  not  allowed.  If  index  funds  receive  the  wrong  signal  that  total  supply 
increases by two units (without being able to determine if this is permanent or not, SI=2), then 
their net long position equals 22.96 units and the optimal stock level is equal to 0.04 unit.  
 
In this simple example, the introduction of futures trading and index funds with imperfect 
information  lowers  the  optimal  stock  by  60%.  Such  framework  may  explain  why  stocks 
remain  low  during  2004-2006  when  index  funds  increase  their  net  long  positions  on 
agricultural commodity futures. On this ground, one may conclude that index funds set the 
conditions, through low stock levels, to the subsequent price spike. However this assertion 
neglects  the  possibility  for  producers  to  optimally  adjust  their  second  period  volume  of 
production. Is the result robust to this potential adjustment ? This is what we examine now.  
 
 
  ii/ With production response 
 
When  producers  have  the  possibility  to  adjust  their  second  period  production  level,  the 
equilibrium  functions  are  completely  different.  Let’s  start  again  without  futures  trading 
(fourth  row  of  table  1).  We  find  that  the  optimal  inventory  level  now  depends  on  the 
permanent  shock  and  has  a  constant  negative  term.
9  The  economic  interpretation  of  the 
                                                 
9 One may object that inventory levels can never be negative. As already noted, we do not introduce initial (first 
period) and final (second period) levels of stocks in the model to simplify the analysis and focus our contribution 
on supply side responses. Adding an exogenous positive stock held by consumers (through the constant term of   12 
negative  constant  term  is  the  following.  Producers  are  risk  averse.  Without  any  risk 
management tools, they want to reduce their optimal second period production level which is 
subject to price risk. When futures trading is ruled out, they only have the storage instrument 
to mitigate the impact of second period price risk on their production. By reducing rather than 
increasing their stocks, the first period equilibrium price is lower and hence this reduces the 
second period optimal production level. In addition, these two decisions (reduced stocks and 
second period production level) reduce the total expected supply in the second period. This is 
beneficial to producers if the demand is price inelastic. The positive impact of the permanent 
shock on the optimal stock level can be explained by another economic mechanism. The 
specification of a supply function is inducing a more price elastic net demand (final demand 
minus production) in the second period . Hence, even if this permanent shock is also observed 
in the second period, its negative price impact will be less important that year. It is thus the 
interest of producers to smooth this supply shock towards the more elastic period.  
 
When futures trading is allowed (fifth row of Table 1), producers have now two possibilities 
to cope with the second period price risk. They can transfer this risk to futures markets in 
addition to manage their storage level. The optimal level of stocks has no longer a negative 
constant because producers now use futures trading to hedge their second period supply. This 
is also apparent in the higher constant of the net long position of index funds. We again find 
that the noisy information brought by index funds has always a negative influence on both the 
optimal inventory level and the funds net long position.  
 
More  important  is  the  last  row  of  Table  1.  It  shows  that  when  production  response  by 
producers is allowed, opening futures trading always increases the optimal stock level (given 
our assumptions on the distribution of supply shocks). So the previous conclusion that index 
funds did contribute to the food price spike by maintaining low pre-spike stocks was not 
robust. The intuition is quite simple. Futures trading facilitates supply decisions by producers. 
This beneficial risk sharing effect largely overcomes the impact of informational externalities 
brought by index funds.    
 
 
  b. Sensitivity analysis 
 
We have to test the sensitivity of our main result to the assumptions regarding price elasticity 
of demand, price elasticity of supply and risk aversion parameter. We focus on the impact of 
allowing futures trading on the optimal stock level. Results are reported in Table 2.  
 
It appears that our main result is highly robust. When the supply response to price is ruled out, 
the  possibility  that  index  funds  lower  the  optimal  stock  level  through  an  informational 
externality  is  likely.  On  the  other  hand,  this  is  unlikely  when  the  supply  response  is 
introduced. This high robustness of our main result certainly has to do with the assumptions 
of rational economic agents. Following Stein, the assumption maintained throughout the paper 
is that they are all able to perfectly observe structural parameters. They only suffer from 
information externalities on supply shocks.  
 
Regarding the risk aversion parameter, we also see little influence and the directions of the 
effects  are  as  expected.  For  instance,  the  constant  term  of  the  optimal  inventory  level 
                                                                                                                                                         
final demand) does not modify the analysis (only the constants of the equations 19 and 21) are modified while 
ensuring that ending stocks never become negative.    13 






The role played by “speculators” in the 2007/08 commodity price spike is lively disputed. 
Analyses conducted so far mainly focus on their behaviour during the price spike through 
statistical methods. In this article we focus our analysis on the increasing participation of 
commodity index funds in agricultural futures markets before the agricultural price spike. Our 
central theme is to determine if their pre-spike massive entry does prepare the subsequent 
crisis by maintaining low stock levels.  
 
In that respect, we develop a theoretical model explaining the behaviour of non commercial 
and commercial traders on commodity cash and futures markets. Following Stein, we allow 
index funds to inflict an informational externality on commercial traders and hence to reduce 
their desire to hold stock. We find that, if commercial traders cannot modify their futures 
production decisions, then the negative impact of index funds on optimal stocks is possible. 
This is because stock is the only means commercial traders have to cope with futures price 
risks. However this negative impact is very unlikely when production can be adjusted. Futures 
trading indeed facilitates supply decisions of producers. Our empirical assessment shows that 
this beneficial risk sharing effect largely overcomes the informational externalities brought by 
index funds. We also find that this positive impact of index funds on optimal stock is highly 
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Table 1. Impacts of futures trading with and without supply response  
 
 
With supply response 
 
Without futures trading 











With futures trading 
First period price 
Inventory level 














Impact of futures trading 
Inventory level  28.57  -0.07  -0.01  -0.07 
 
 









Without supply response 
 
Without futures trading 











With futures trading 
First period price 
Inventory level 














Impact of futures trading 
Inventory level  0  0.15  0.24  -0.15   15 
Table 2. Impacts of futures trading on optimal inventory levels with and without supply 
















Base values : demand elasticity = - 0.5, production elasticity = 1, risk aversion = 1 
 
Without supply response  0  0.15  0.24  -0.15 
With supply response  28.57  -0.07  -0.01  -0.07 
 
Elastic demand : demand elasticity = - 2, production elasticity = 1, risk aversion = 1 
 
Without supply response  0  0.11  0.12  -0.11 
With supply response  36.36  -0.01  0.04  -0.08 
 
Inelastic supply : demand elasticity = - 0.5, production elasticity = 0.5, risk aversion = 1 
 
Without supply response  0  0.15  0.24  -0.15 
With supply response  42.10  -0.07  -0.02  -0.05 
 
Elastic supply : demand elasticity = - 0.5, production elasticity = 2, risk aversion = 1 
 
Without supply response  0  0.15  0.24  -0.15 
With supply response  17.39  -0.07  -0.02  -0.05 
 
Risk aversion : demand elasticity = - 0.5, production elasticity = 1, risk aversion = 3 
 
Without supply response  0  0.16  0.30  -0.16 
With supply response  31.58  -0.08  -0.01  -0.08   16 

































Source : FAO 
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Source: The Global Food Markets Group (2010) 
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